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Abstract
Effective coordination is key to many situations that affect the well-being of two or more humans. Social coordination can
be studied in coordination games between individuals located on networks of contacts. We study the behavior of humans
in the laboratory when they play the Stag Hunt game – a game that has a risky but socially efficient equilibrium and an
inefficient but safe equilibrium. We contrast behavior on a cliquish network to behavior on a random network. The cliquish
network is highly clustered and resembles more closely to actual social networks than the random network. In contrast to
simulations, we find that human players dynamics do not converge to the efficient outcome more often in the cliquish
network than in the random network. Subjects do not use pure myopic best-reply as an individual update rule. Numerical
simulations agree with laboratory results once we implement the actual individual updating rule that human subjects use in
our laboratory experiments.
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Introduction
Game theory [1] is a useful tool in the study of economic, social,
and biological situations for describing interactions between agents
having possibly different and often conflicting objectives. Paradig-
matic games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma have been used in
order to represent the tension that appears in society when
individual objectives are in conflict with socially desirable
outcomes. Indeed, most of the vast research literature has focused
on conflicting situations in order to uncover the mechanisms that
could lead to cooperation instead of socially harmful outcomes.
However, there are important situations in social and economic
contexts that do not require players to use aggressive strategies but
simply to coordinate their actions on a common goal, since in
many cases the best course of action is to conform to the standard
behavior. For example, if one is used to drive on the right side of
the road and travels to a country where the norm is reversed, it
pays off to follow the local norm. Games that express this
extremely common kind of interactions are called coordination games.
One important consideration is the interaction structure of the
playing agents. It is frequently assumed, especially in theoretical
work but also in many laboratory experiments, that agents interact
globally with any other agent in the population. However,
everyday observation tells us that in animal and human societies,
individuals usually tend to interact more often with some specified
subset of partners; for instance, teenagers tend to adopt the
fashions of their close friends group; closely connected groups
usually follow the same religion, and so on. In short, social
interaction is mediated by networks, in which vertices identify
people, firms etc., and edges identify some kind of relation between
the concerned vertices such as friendship, collaboration, economic
exchange and so on. Thus, locality of interaction plays an
important role. The dynamical behavior of games on networks has
been investigated both theoretically and by numerical simulation
methods (see [2–6] for comprehensive recent reviews).
Several analytically rigorous results are available for coordina-
tion games in well-mixed populations [7,8], as well as populations
with a simple local interaction structure such as rings and grids
[9,10]. These results are very useful and will be summarized later
on; however, while game theory has normative value, its
prescriptions are not always reflected in the way people act when
confronted with these situations. This has been made manifest by a
host of results of experiments with people [11]. Coordination
games are no exception and also confront the theory with many
puzzles. For coordination games on small-worlds and regular
networks the laboratory experiments carried out in [12] and in
[13–15] are particularly relevant.
In this paper we describe and discuss a laboratory experiment
on coordination games using particular local network structures
that are characteristic of real social interactions and thus go
beyond the simple and well-known rings and grids usually
employed in such experiments. By doing so we wish to understand
how well the theoretical or simulated actions of automata align
with choices by humans. If theory and simulations line up well
with actual choices in the laboratory this re-inforces the use of
these relatively cheap tools to understanding behavior. In contrast,
if the laboratory reveals results that are not to be expected from
theory or simulations, there is a need to refine theory and
simulation methods.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present
a brief introduction to the subject of coordination games and we
summarize the main known theoretical results in order to provide
the right context for the experimental part. The following sections
deal with the main theme of the present study where, after a
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discussion of previous related work, we present the setup and the
results of our laboratory experiment related to the relevant
network structures. Finally, we present a detailed discussion of the
results in the context of related work and give our conclusions.
Coordination Games
As in most previous work, we shall restrict ourselves to two-
person, two-strategies, symmetric coordination games. General
two-person, two-strategies coordination games have the normal
form of Table 1. Here we shall assume that awb and
(a{d)ƒ(b{c); then (b,b) is the risk-dominant equilibrium,
while (a,a) is the Pareto-dominant one. This simply means that
players get a higher payoff by coordinating on (a,a) but they risk
less by using strategy b instead. There is also a third equilibrium in
mixed strategies but it is evolutionarily unstable. The Pareto-
efficient equilibrium (a,a) is socially preferable but mis-coordina-
tion may happen easily leading to inefficient outcomes. This type
of game is the so-called Stag-Hunt game [16]; it has been
extensively studied analytically using stochastic processes [7,9] and
by numerical simulation on several model network types [6,16,17].
In well-mixed populations, agents may use myopic best-reply [8] to
revise their strategy. This is a deterministic, bounded-rationality
adaptive learning rule in which, in each time step, an agent has the
opportunity of revising her current strategy with probability p. She
does so by considering the previous actions of the rest of the
population and switches to the action that would maximize her
payoff if the other players stick to their previous choices. In other
words, s^i is a myopic best-reply for player i if
Pi(s^i(t),s{i(t{1))wPi(si(t),s{i(t{1)), Vsi, where s{i(t{1)
is the strategy profile of all players other than i at time t{1. In
case of a tie, agent i keeps its current strategy.
For best reply both monomorphic populations of all a and all b
are asymptotically stable states [18]. However, if some noise is
introduced in best response dynamics to simulate strategy update
errors of various kinds then the stochastically stable state in the
long run will be the risk-dominant strategy b since the risk-
dominant strategy has the largest basin [7,8].
When the population has a network structure the strategy-
revision rule described above is slightly modified in such a way that
it works for pairs of agents that are neighbors [6,8,9]. For
populations structured as rings, the risk-dominant strategy b
should take over the population in the long run [8,9] if the agents
play according to myopic best-reply. If, instead, agents imitate the
strategy of their most successful neighbor and the neighborhood
size is large enough, then the payoff-dominant strategy becomes
the unique long-run equilibrium [4]. In two-dimensional grids,
both equilibria can be reached depending on the evolution rules
considered and, most remarkably, dimorphic states, i.e. population
states in which a and b players coexist in a stable manner, become
possible [4,10,16,19]. An important feature of these local models is
that the convergence is faster than in global interaction models [4].
No general theoretical results on coordination games are
available for arbitrary networks. However, the simulation results
show that the presence of a local interaction structure provided by
a network tends to increase the region of the game’s parameter
space in which the Pareto-dominant outcome prevails [6,16].
Moreover, dimorphic populations may be stable in complex
networks thanks to the existence of recognizable communities of
tightly linked agents [20].
The conclusion of this brief summary on theoretical results is
that either the all-a or all-b convention can be reached as a stable
state in well-mixed populations depending on details such as agent
matching, noise, and strategy revision rule. On rings, the stable
state in the long-run is most probably the risk-efficient equilibrium
all-b, although all-a can also arise if agents imitate the best
neighbor and neighborhoods are large. On grids and complex
networks in general both monomorphic and dimorphic popula-
tions can be stable, thus both strategies can coexist.
Previous Experimental Results on Coordination Games
with Local Interactions
We have seen that theory alone is not discriminating enough to
solve the equilibrium selection problem by analytical means and
thus empirical approaches are very valuable. Indeed, coordination
games have been the object of a number of experimental works in
the last two decades. Among the most well-known studies dealing
with randomly mixing populations and groups, we may cite e.g.
[21–25] and chapter seven of Camerer’s book [11], where an
informative summary is provided.
Given the focus of our work, we concentrate here on situations
in which local interaction structures and thus networks play a
fundamental role. To our knowledge, there have been few
experiments in which the population structure that has been
recreated in the laboratory only allows for local interactions.
Possibly among others, the works of My et al. [13]. of Keser et al.
[14], of Berninghaus et al. [15], and of Cassar [12] are relevant in
this context.
Keser at al. used a ring structure where each player has a
neighbor on either side and a well-mixed structure for comparison.
Their conclusions are that in the ring the preferred equilibrium is
the risk-dominant one, while the payoff-dominant equilibrium was
the more frequent result in the globally communicating popula-
tion. This is in qualitative agreement with the theoretical
predictions of Ellison [9] for the ring and of Kandori et al. [7]
for the mixing case.
My et al. performed a comparative experimental study of Stag
Hunt games with three different payoff matrices on mixing and
structured populations. The population with local structure was
composed by a circle of eight people where each player only
interacted with her immediate right and left neighbors. They find
that the first period modal choice of strategy, which is the payoff
dominant one, plays a major role in the final outcome. In the
global population case, the steady state generally lies in the same
basin of attraction as the initial state. For the ring structure, the
convergence to the risk-dominant outcome is more frequent than
in the well-mixed case, especially when the payoff matrix values
are such that the Pareto-superior basin shrinks. However, still
often times the system converges to the Pareto-dominant state,
which disagrees with the theoretical predictions of Ellison [9]
based on noisy best reply dynamics. By examining the detailed
history of play, the experimenters have found that, while in the
global population subjects on average play myopic best response,
in the ring with local structure a kind of imitation rule fits the data
better than best reply.
In the study of Berninghaus et al. the authors find that a ring of
eight or sixteen players leads to less coordination on the Pareto-
efficient strategy a in the average than in groups of three
Table 1. A general two-person, two-strategies symmetric
game.
a b
a a, a c, d
b d, c b, b
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055033.t001
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completely connected players. In addition, with the same
neighborhood size, grids of sixteen individuals are less effective
in evolving coordination on the efficient equilibrium.
Our study is close to three other studies. The first study is the
modeling and simulation work of Roca et al. [26], with some
unavoidable limitations related to the small size achievable in the
laboratory. Roca et al. studied cooperation and coordination on a
couple of actual social networks and identified a different behavior:
in one of the networks the Pareto-efficient strategy a cannot
propagate and the final equilibrium results in a dimorphic
population. They attributed the phenomenon, which is deemed
to be quite general, to the existence of topological traps, which are
local network features characterized by local bridges [27] and
scarcity of redundant paths. These structures make it difficult for
any flow to easily propagate past the trap.
The second is the study of Cassar [12], which is the closest one
from the standpoint of the present paper as it investigates network
structures that are more realistic than the ring and the two-
dimensional lattice, although the ring is also used in the
experiments for comparison. Basically, the main finding of Cassar
was that small-world networks were apparently the more
conducive to coordination on the Pareto-efficient outcome, and
she attributed this effect to the higher clustering of these networks
with respect to random structures. We shall discuss her settings
and results in more detail later.
The third article describes a recent experimental investigation
on coordination games on various kinds of small-size networks
[28]. The authors focus on equilibrium selection in these networks
by the experimental subjects as compared with theoretical
predictions. They found little support for the prediction that
network effects have an influence on the emergence of a given
equilibrium, as most groups coordinated on the efficient equilib-
rium irrespective of the network shape. However, they did find a
difference between inexperienced subjects and those that have
already played the game. After the first run, most groups
coordinated on the efficient equilibrium very quickly. We also
observed a strong initial bias towards playing strategy a at the
beginning of a run, a tendency that becomes stronger when
subjects have gained some better understanding of the game (see
section Results). Although the study is interesting, it is not really
comparable to ours since the network size is very small (six) and
this of course makes network effects more difficult to assess.
Moreover, in most runs the participants had full information on
the strategies and positions of all the other players, while in our
case knowledge was effectively restricted to the first neighbors.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The use of human subjects in economics laboratory experiments
has been approved by the ethics committee of the University of
Lausanne. The participants were fully informed of the nature of
the experiment and signed an informed consent to participate.
Their anonymity has been guaranteed at all stages of the
experiment.
Network Design
We designed two basic network topologies containing 20 nodes
each: a random network and a cliquish network. The random
network, shown in Fig. 1a, is a regular random graph of degree
five and is used as a baseline case in which no topological traps are
present. The average clustering coefficient of this graph is 0.15.
Two different matches of this topology, denoted by R1 and R2
respectively, were tested with random relabeling of nodes between
them. The idea behind a constant degree and relabeling of nodes
is to avoid confusing the effect of the topology itself with that of the
particular location of the node in it. This structure was used as a
baseline against which the following is to be compared with respect
to the game behavior.
The cliquish network is reproduced in Fig. 1b. Here each agent
has the same number of neighbors (five) but she is more strongly
connected to four of them, those belonging to the five-clique
structure. This network was designed to reproduce the kind of
topological traps of Roca et al. [26] introduced above, as the low
number of links between cliques could, in principle, play the role
of traps. This graph has an average clustering coefficient of 0.6,
Figure 1. Network topologies used in the experiments. a: regular random graph; b: cliquish network.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055033.g001
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much higher than the random graph one (see above). Again, two
matches of this topology were tested, that we denote as C1 and C2.
In our opinion, the non-random network used in the
experiments is much closer to actual social networks in its local
structure than any previously used topology in the laboratory as
rings and grids. Indeed, we found that comparable structures were
independently used by Suri and Watts in a Web-based experi-
mental study of public goods games [29].
Specific Coordination Game
With reference to Table 1, we have chosen a particular game in
the coordination game space by fixing a~1, b~0, and c~{1.
Then, using numerical simulations, we have varied the last
parameter d in the interval ½0,1 in such a way as to choose the
value of d that approximately maximizes the difference in
equilibrium fractions of a strategists and b strategists between
the random network and the cliquish one. Figure 2 shows the
average results of 100 simulation runs on each of the networks,
considering myopic best-response as update rule and an initial
fraction of 0.7 a-strategists. This last value is rather typical, being
close to the initial frequencies of a that have been observed in
many laboratory experiments. Absolute values of the differences in
steady state frequencies of a between the random graph and the
cliquish network are reported on the y-axis as a function of d and
are systematically higher for d about 0:35ƒdƒ0:75. We fixed
d~0:5, a value that lies in the interior of the interval that
discriminates well between the cliquish and the random network.
From these values, in order to obtain positive integer payoff values,
we have performed an affine transformation of the matrix which
leaves the NE invariant and leads to the matrix used in the
experiment shown in Table 2.
For the particular coordination game represented by this
matrix, the mixed equilibrium is found to be (a~2=3, b~1=3)
and the corresponding basins are sketched in Fig. 3. It is worth
noting that the game used here is formally equivalent to the one
employed in Cassar’s experiments [12].
We performed many numerical simulations on the graph
structures shown in Fig. 1. We only present a summary of the
results to save space; detailed data are available on request. Using
pure best response as a strategy update rule on the cliquish
network (Fig. 1b) and starting with 50% a-strategists the dynamics
converges on all-b 90% of the time, after 1000 repetitions;
otherwise there is one clique of a players that remain stable and
the rest of the population plays b. With an initial fraction of a of
about 80%, we never observe convergence on a b monomorphic
population. Instead, in 96% of the runs the game dynamics
converged on dimorphic populations with cliques conquered
either by a or b strategists and only 4% went to the all-a
equilibrium. This last result shows that, in the absence of noise and
errors of some kind, weak links do indeed cause freezing of the
strategies in some parts of the network. In a series of runs we
perturbed deterministic best response by adding a 0:1 probability
of making errors. In these conditions we always found convergence
on the all-b fixed point with both initial proportions. This is
understandable as, with noise added, dimorphic configurations
that were stable with pure best response, are destabilized and
ultimately broken.
The baseline case of the regular random network of Fig. 1a is
indeed rather different. With pure best response and an initial
proportion of 50% a, the dynamics always converges to all b. With
80% a initially, convergence is on all a in 92% of the cases, with
some runs converging to dimorphic populations. As soon as noise
is added to pure best response, all the runs converged to the b
fixed point for both initial conditions.
Implementation
We conducted a total of four experimental sessions that counted
20 participants each using the z-Tree environment [30]. Partic-
ipants were recruited from a subject pool that includes students
from several faculties. In each session, subjects played the
coordination game in four different network topologies, and each
topology lasted for 30 periods. In other words, the location of
nodes in a network remained unchanged during 30 periods.
Table 3 summarizes the order in which the different network
topologies were implemented in each session.
Each period counted two stages. In the first stage, players had to
select one of the two strategies, that we called ‘‘square’’ and
‘‘circle’’ instead of a and b in order to avoid suggesting an implicit
ranking. Subjects were allowed to take as much time as they
Figure 2. x-axis: payoff value d; y-axis: absolute value of the
difference between fractions of a strategy at steady state in
random and cliquish networks. The values are averages over
100 simulation runs for each network structure (see text).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055033.g002
Table 2. Specific coordination game used in the experiment.
a b
a 5, 5 1, 4
b 4, 1 3, 3
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055033.t002
Figure 3. Basins of attraction for a strategy (right basin) and for
b (left basin) when using the numerical payoffs of the
experimental coordination game. P(a)~2=3 is the unstable
dimorphic equilibrium.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055033.g003
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wanted to reach a decision. The average response time was 2
seconds so most subjects were very fast in selecting their strategy.
In the second stage, subjects observed on the screen their own
choice, the number of neighbors that selected each strategy and
their own gain of the period. In particular, they were never
informed about their neighbors’ payoffs, nor about their individual
strategy choices. This implies that payoff-based imitation rules are
ruled out, since subjects cannot identify the most successful
strategy.
Students read a detailed description of the experiment before
the started playing the game. After reading the instructions,
subjects had to respond to a set of control questions that insured
common understanding of the game and the computation of
payoffs. A translation of the instructions distributed to subjects is
provided as supplementary material to this paper. After one round
of 30 periods, subjects were informed that they would play the
same game for another 30 periods, but that their neighbors (and
their neighbors’ neighbors) would be different than the ones met in
the previous round. They were not informed about the particular
network topology of the society, but they were aware that they
(and everyone else) would always play the game with five
neighbors. Each session lasted for about 80 minutes and subjects
earned, on average, 36.6 swiss francs, or about 30 EUR (37 USD).
Results
Aggregate Behavior
Fig. 4 reports the proportion of players choosing the efficient
strategy a aggregated over all sessions and periods. Strategy a is
the preferred choice at any time period in both topologies. Players
on random networks coordinate a bit more often on the payoff-
dominant strategy a than players on the cliquish network (Fig. 4a).
Yet, a standard t-test that accounts for clustering across individuals
does not reject the hypothesis that the proportion of a-strategists is
the same in both topologies.
When dis-aggregating by period (Fig. 4b), we see that subjects
seem to understand payoff-dominance from the very first period,
where no more than 20% of the population minimizes risk by
choosing strategy b. From this high initial rate of a-choices,
convergence to almost full coordination on the payoff-dominant
strategy is quite rapid.
Estimating Individual Behavior
Our interest lies in understanding how subjects make their
choices in response to their neighbor’s choices. The key graph
compares the choice of strategy with the information received
about the strategy choice of neighbors in the previous period. Fig. 5
plots the proportion of individual a-choices against the proportion
of a-choices in the neighborhood in the previous period.
First of all, it is evident that most subjects are sensitive to the
information regarding their neighbors’ choices, since their own
decisions are correlated to it. Moreover, the effect of this
information is monotone: the higher the proportion of a-choices
in my neighborhood, the higher the probability that I also choose
a in the next period. Second, the effect seems to be non-linear or,
more precisely, S-shaped. This would suggest that the biggest
change in individual behavior occurs at intermediate values of the
neighborhood’s distribution of a-choices. We now discuss how to
use this evidence to infer whether individuals play myopic best-
reply or not.
Remember that a player’s strategy s in any given period is a
myopic best-reply if, assuming that the distribution of her
neighbors’ strategies remains unchanged, it gives her a higher
payoff than any other strategy.
Let pi,t{1(a) denote the fraction of neighbors of individual i that
chose s~a in the previous period. That is
pi,t{1(a)~DNi D{1
X
j[Ni
aj,t{1 with aj,t~
1 if sj,t~a
0 if sj,t~b

:
where Ni is the neighborhood of i and DNi D its cardinality (i.e. the
degree of node i). Given the payoffs used in this experiment, the
(myopic) expected gains to subject i of choosing each strategy in
period t are
E½Pi,tDsi,t~a~5|pi,t{1(a)z1|½1{pi,t{1(a)
E½Pi,tDsi,t~b~4|pi,t{1(a)z3|½1{pi,t{1(a)
Thus, choosing the payoff-dominant strategy a is a best response
if.
E½Pi,tDsi,t~a{E½P i,tDsi,t~bw0
u Di,t:3pi,t{1(a){2w0 ð1Þ
Borrowing the terminology used in Cassar [12], we will refer to
the amount Di,t as the ‘‘payoff advantage’’ of choosing strategy a.
Myopic best-reply means that an individual switches to playing a
as soon as more than 2 out of 3 of her neighbors play a, i.e. as soon
as the payoff advantage becomes positive.
If a subject uses myopic best-reply as update rule, we should
observe si,t~a whenever (1) holds, i.e. the payoff advantage of
choosing a is positive, and si,t~b otherwise. Hence, we can
estimate a model of the form
Table 3. Summary of experimental sessions.
Session Date Subjects Network 1 Network 2 Network 3 Network 4
1 03.10.2011 20 C1 C2 R1 R2
2 07.10.2011 20 R1 R2 C1 C2
3 07.10.2011 20 C1 R1 C2 R2
4 14.10.2011 20 R1 C1 R2 C2
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055033.t003
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Prob(si,t~ajpi,t{1(a))
~G(c0zc1Di,tzc2Ci,tzc3Di,tCi,tzx
0
i,tw)
ð2Þ
where Ci,t~1(Di,tw0), and xi,t includes other relevant control
variables. G(:) is a cumulative distribution function.
The parameter c1 measures the effect of the payoff advantage
on the probability of choosing a, when this advantage is negative.
If the subject follows myopic best-reply this parameter is zero
because a negative payoff advantage, regardless of its size, should
translate into a zero probability of choosing strategy a. The
parameter c2 measures the discrete jump in the probability of
playing a once more than two thirds of neighbors play a. A myopic
best-replier should go from choosing a with zero probability to
choosing it with certainty as soon as the payoff advantage becomes
Figure 4. Proportion of a-choices by network topology. Proportions are aggregated over all sessions and periods in A, and over session in
B.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055033.g004
Figure 5. Proportion of a-choices as a function of the fraction of neighbors that chose a in the previous period. Dashed line at two
thirds: at the left of the dashed line a myopic best replier chooses a with probability zero; at the right of the dashed line a myopic best replier chooses
a with probability one.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055033.g005
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positive. This means that c2 is 1 for a pure myopic best-replier.
Finally, c1zc3 measures the effect of the payoff advantage on the
probability of choosing a, when this advantage is positive. Again,
c1 and c3 are zero for a player who plays myopic best-reply.
The specification (2) amounts to fitting the S-shaped relation-
ship observed in the data of Fig. 5. To estimate the model, we
consider G(:) to be the uniform cdf and we include as control
variables the lagged individual choice (to control for lock-in due to
either inertia or unobserved heterogeneity), dummies for 5-period
intervals and for the order in which the particular topology was
played in the session. We have also explored estimating model (1)
adopting a logistic specification for G(:), but did not pursue this
approach since players ended up playing the a strategy with
probability 1 in one repetition of the experiment. The logistic
specification rules out such cases whereas the uniform specification
allows for it. Table 4 reports the sensitivity of the probability of
playing a to the excess payoff (Di,t), the change in that probability
as the fraction playing a exceeds 2 out of 3 (Ci,t), and the change in
the sensitivity as the fraction of players playing a exceeds two
thirds (Di,tCi,t). Inference is based on standard errors that account
for clustering within individuals.
The parameter c1 is estimated to be positive and significantly
different from zero in both network topologies. This means that
subjects are more likely to play a the less negative the payoff
advantage of playing a is. Second, there is some evidence of an
increase in the probability of choosing a when the payoff
advantage becomes positive, but the magnitude of the shift is
small (c2 close to zero). Subjects are no longer sensitive to the
Table 4. Estimation of a-choice.
Random Cliquish
Di,t 0.202* 0.271***
(0.085) (0.046)
Ci,t 0.065 0.088*
(0.047) (0.033)
Di,t Ci,t 20.193* 20.247***
(0.084) (0.046)
ai,t–1 0.572*** 0.500***
(0.097) (0.099)
periods6to10 20.023** 20.008
(0.007) (0.009)
periods11to15 20.022** 20.009
(0.008) (0.007)
periods16to20 20.023** 20.010
(0.008) (0.008)
periods21to25 20.014 20.007
(0.007) (0.006)
periods26to30 20.019 20.008
(0.010) (0.008)
order2 0.029 0.006
(0.018) (0.009)
order3 0.018 0.003
(0.011) (0.008)
order4 0.022 0.002
(0.014) (0.009)
Session dummies Yes Yes
N 4640 4640
Notes: standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses.
***pv0.01,
**pv0.05,
*pv0.1.
Table presents marginal effects from a linear probability model. Di,t is the payoff
advantage of choosing a given the distribution of neighbors’ choices in
previous period; Ci,t=1(Di,t.0); a= 1 (si,j= a); Ci,t=1(Di periods# are dummies
for 5-period intervals; Order#=1 if network played in the #th order in a
session; cliquish= 1 if cliquish topology, = 0 if random. Session dummies were
included but turned out to be not significant.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055033.t004
Table 5. Estimation of a-choice (interacted specification).
All repetitions First repetition
Delta 0.213 0.232
(0.086)* (0.087)**
{0.011}*** {0.006}***
[0.112]*
C 0.074 0.069
(0.048) (0.056)
{0.016}* {0.036}
[0.062]
Delta*C 20.197 20.220
(0.084)* (0.090)*
[0.105]*
Delta*cliquish 0.044 0.014
(0.090) (0.120)
[0.118]
C*cliquish 0.003 20.011
(0.057) (0.077)
[0.081]
Delta*C*cliquish 20.034 0.048
(0.092) (0.128)
[0.112]
cliquish 20.005 20.015
(0.057) (0.072)
[0.058]
l.alpha 0.540 0.482
(0.092)*** (0.064)***
[0.025]***
Constant 0.364 0.406
(0.087)*** (0.073)***
[0.023]***
N 9280 2320
r2 0.525 0.378
Order dummies yes no
Session dummies yes no
Period-interval dummies yes yes
Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. Restricted standard
errors in square brackets (assuming independent sessions, no correlation
between unconnected subjects in a session, no contemporaneous correlation
between connected subjects, no correlation at lagsw1 between connected
subjects). * pv:05, ** pv:01, and *** pv:001 (t-distribution with G{1 degrees
of freedom, with G the number of clusters. The restricted standard errors
consider the same distribution as the individual clustering.).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055033.t005
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payoff advantage as soon as more than two out of three of their
neighbors have switched to playing a. These results reject the
hypothesis that all subjects in the laboratory adopted pure myopic
best reply as update rule.
Regarding the other variables, we see evidence of lock-in in that
past individual choices are correlated to current ones. This could
either be due to inertia or, as stressed by Berninghaus et al. [15], to
unobserved heterogeneity. Players are significantly less likely to
play a in rounds 6 to 20 (compared to rounds 1 to 5) in the random
network. This effect is not present in the cliquish network.
Moreover, the order in which the topologies were played do not
matter.
Results suggest that players are somewhat more sensitive to their
neighbor’s choices in cliquish networks than in random ones.
Moreover, clustering could also be present across individuals
within the same network. Table 5 reports an empirical specifica-
tion that allows testing whether the updating rule differs between
the cliquish and the random network. Column ‘‘All repetitions’’
reports results that use all repetitions in the experiment. Column
‘‘First repetition’’ reports results based on the first network
topology that subjects played. All estimates report the standard
errors clustered by individual in parentheses. The ‘‘first repetition’’
estimates report the standard error in brackets that allow for
clustering at the individual level and for correlation between
individual i’s choice in period t with the decisions of her neighbors
in t21. We do not report these standard errors in column 1 since
we have been able to figured out how to calculate these standard
errors only for the first repetition. The standard solution to
account for clustering within sessions would be to assume arbitrary
clustering within networks. While this assumption is realistic we do
not have a sufficient number of sessions to apply this solution.
Table 5 shows two main results. First, the parameters in the
update rule do not differ by topology. The terms Di,tcliquish,
Ci,t  cliquish, and Di,t  Ci,t  cliquish measure the difference in
update rule parameters between the cliquish and the random
network. None of these three parameters is significantly different
from zero, regardless of the standard errors we use to perform the
test. Second, column two indicates that our main result that
subjects do not use myopic best reply is valid, again regardless of
the type of standard error we use.
Figure 6 plots the predicted probabilities of choosing a against
the actual choices as a function of the previous period proportion
of a-choices in the neighborhood. It appears that model (2) does a
very good job in fitting the observed data, in particular for cliquish
networks.
Discussion
Influence of the Network Structure
The analysis of the previous section has shown that human
subjects do not use myopic best reply as an update rule. The
analysis also shows that interaction structure has no influence on
the aggregate fraction of individuals playing the efficient strategy
a. We also do not find that network structure is important for how
subjects adapt to their neighbor’s choices.
It is worthwhile to try to relate our observations with the
theoretical predictions of Roca et al. [26]. In the experimental
results we didn’t see clear signs of the fact that topological traps re-
created in the laboratory by having cliques of players weakly
connected to each other (see Fig. 1) do actually cause freezing of
inefficient b coordination zones or, equivalently, prevent a to
spread further past the trap. There can be several reasons for this.
First of all, while the strategy revision rule for the artificial agents
was noiseless and always the same for all players, human subjects
make errors and may try to experiment to gain more knowledge
about the neighbors’ behavior. In particular, even a stable
situation may become unstable if agents do not apply strict best
response at the next time step. In fact, the update rule in Roca et
al. [26] was payoff-based imitation dynamics, which cannot arise
in any form here since the players are not informed about the
payoffs of their neighbors. In addition, in the experiments strategy
a is always predominant in the first time step. Whatever the
psychological or strategic reasons for that, it makes it more difficult
for strategy b to gain a stronghold in a clique. Taken together,
these two reasons make stable dimorphic states more difficult to
attain than in theory or simulations based on simple and invariant
protocol revision rules.
Moreover, while we were able to study small human networks of
twenty people because of financial and equipment limitation,
reasons that are common in this kind of laboratory work,
simulations can be done on much larger systems in which the
Figure 6. Actual and predicted proportion of a-choices as a function of the fraction of neighbors that chose a in the previous
period.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055033.g006
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number of possible dimorphic stable states is higher. Finally,
because of the size limitations of our networks, the degree
correlation between agents at distance two and three, to which
Roca et al. attribute an important role, are not meaningful. In
spite of this, dimorphic situations in which some cliques were
playing b have been observed in the experiment. We identified
such a state when at least one clique counted at least four a-
strategists during the last five periods of a round and, at the same
time, at least one clique counted at least four b-strategists during
the last five periods of a round. Indeed, two out of the eight
cliquish networks implemented ended up in a dimorphic stable
state. In four of the cliquish networks all cliques became a-stable,
while in the remaining two cliquish networks some cliques became
a-stable while the others remained unstable. In terms of cliques,
we find that 75 % of the cliques end up in a state where all players
choose the a strategy in the final round, 12.5 % of the cliques have
4 out of 5 players choosing a, and the remaining cliques 12.5 % of
the cliques were uniformly distributed between no-one choosing a
and 3 out of 5 choosing a.
Interestingly, our results differ strongly from our own simula-
tions that were based on the exact same network structures as in the
laboratory and best response. The simulations predicted that from
a 85% initial proportion of a-strategies, (i) most random networks
end up in an all-b equilibrium while some of them end up in
dimorphic states, and (ii) most cliquish networks end up in
dimorphic states while a few of them end up in an all-a
equilibrium. Figure 7 reports the difference in the proportion of
players choosing a in the random network compared to the
cliquish network assuming that the initial proportion of players
choosing a equals 85 % (this is the average fraction we observe in
the laboratory over the four treatments). The simulations that
assume myopic best reply as an update rule predict that the
random network will have about 31 % fewer players choosing a
than the cliquish network from round 11 onwards. This prediction
contrasts sharply with the main result from the laboratory
experiment that the proportion of players choosing a does not
differ by topology. Interestingly, we are able to reproduce this
laboratory result once we run simulations that implement the
Figure 7. Difference in proportion of players choosing a between random network and cliquish network. The figure reports
simulations that use myopic best reply, the actual observed difference in the laboratory, and simulations that use the observed updating rule in
Figure 5, averaged over topologies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055033.g007
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empirical updating rule that players use in the laboratory
experiment (we implement the updating rule reported in
Figure 5, averaged over topologies). This result highlights the
usefulness of laboratory experiments to update the common
behaviors implemented in the automata used in numerical
simulations. See also the work of Grujic’ et al. [31] that does
another step in this direction.
Comparison with Related Experimental Results
Here we compare our results with the conclusions of a recent
experimental study by Cassar [12]. Cassar’s work is the more
related to ours since it is the only one we could find in the
literature that explicitly tests for the influence of complex network
structure on coordination games, with the exception of [28] which
however deals with very small networks. She conducted a
laboratory study in which eighteen subjects were virtually disposed
as networks of three types: ring, small-world of the Watts-Strogatz
class [32], and a random network, all with four neighbors per
agent on average. The small-world networks in particular have a
high clustering coefficient and a short path length. Aside from that,
neither the ring nor the random or small-world networks featured
cliques and weak links as in our settings (Fig. 1b). Each run
consisted of eighty periods on average and three realizations of
each network class were used. Ten runs were monitored in total
for the three network types. The information available to the
subjects was similar to ours including the number of randomly
assigned neighbors and the fact that they were to stay the same
during a given run. Cassar studied both the Prisoner’s Dilemma as
well as the Stag Hunt games. Here we only comment about the
Stag Hunt case. The payoff matrix for the coordination game in
Cassar is equivalent to ours through an affine transformation.
Most of Cassar’s runs started with high initial rates of a strategies
and ended in the all a state, with the small-world networks being
apparently the more conducive to coordination on the Pareto-
efficient outcome. The differences, however, are small and their
statistical significance is doubtful (see also the discussion of Cassar’s
Prisoner Dilemma results in [29], where some doubt is cast on
their statistical interpretation).
Our results also show a consistent preference for a initially as
well as later in the runs. However, we do not find that network
structure plays a role. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma case, similar
conclusions have been reached in a recent very large-scale
experimental study on grids and scale-free networks by Gracia-
La´zaro et al. [33] in which the authors conclude that the level of
cooperation reached in both structures is the same. Likewise, Suri
and Watts conclude that the network topology had no statistically
significant effect on the average contribution in a public goods
game [29].
Cassar also analyzed the individual player decision making and
came to the conclusion that best reply and inertia are significant in
explaining behavior. While we also find evidence of inertia, we
reject that subjects in our experiment use best-reply as update rule.
Conclusions
We study the role of network topology for coordination
decisions in a Stag Hunt game. Numerical simulations of the
setting suggest that populations of 20 players will end up in a
dimorphic state more often in the cliquish network than in the
random network. Also, players choose the efficient strategy a more
often in the random network. While we find that human subjects
in a laboratory setting do converge more often to dimorphic states
in cliquish networks than in random networks, there is no
difference in terms of the proportion coordinating on the efficient
outcome between the two topologies. Moreover, subjects do not
use best-reply as update rule. Numerical simulations agree with
laboratory results once we implement the actual updating rule that
human subjects in our laboratory experiments use.
This evidence suggests that numerical simulations can be a
useful tool to understanding coordination in small scale societies.
However, they should incorporate more empirical knowledge on
their strategy update functions, which are currently too simplistic.
These methods can then be updated and improved, hopefully not
only for small scale but also for large scale societies – settings
where laboratory studies are hard and very costly to implement.
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